This study investigated electrophysiological correlates of beliefbias e¡ects in syllogistic reasoning. Event-related brain potentials were recorded for minor premises with which participants were required to draw a logic conclusion during three conditions: the inhibitory belief condition (IBC, the belief is inhibitory to the logical task), the facilitatory belief condition (FBC, the belief is facilitatory to the logical task), and the baseline condition.The results demonstrated a more positive event-related potential de£ection during IBC and FBC conditions than during the noninference baseline condition in both the 300^500 and the 1000^1600 ms time windows. Moreover, IBC elicited a more positive event-related potential de£ection (P500) than did FBC across central-frontal cortical regions during the 300^600 ms interval. Therefore, this study observed a clear belief-bias e¡ect, and the enhanced P500 activity during IBC, which relates to the belief bias that obstructs normal inferences, most likely re£ects an inhibition to beliefs during later relation integration stage.
Introduction
Syllogistic reasoning is an important form of deductive reasoning that involves extracting information implicit in the premises. The occurrence of this reasoning is based on the presentation of a pair of categorical premises such as: all A are B (major premise); all B are C (minor premise), where a logical conclusion is 'all A are C'. Errors in deductive reasoning are not necessarily due to a lack of logical ability but are typically arising from the unsuccessful inhibition of belief-bias [1] . Many studies have shown that people tend to accept believable conclusions and to reject unbelievable conclusions, regardless of logicality [2] [3] [4] . Therefore, the beliefs that are consistent with the logical conclusion would facilitate one's performance during the logical task; in contrast, the beliefs that disagree with the conclusion are often inhibitory to the logical task [5] .
As described above, an empirically true, and logical, conclusion is often generated from clearly true premises. However, it is the case that an empirically false conclusion can be derived from premises that are generally considered to be true [6] . It has been reported that people often make logical inferences that lead to empirically false conclusions under appropriate instructions [7, 8] . For instance, given the premises 'all A are B (major premise); all C are B (minor premise)'; it would be clear that the relation between A and C is indefinite (conclusion). Nevertheless, the case changes when empirically true premises filled in this format of reasoning, and our empirical beliefs would bias our logical inferences in the following two ways. Condition 1: all sparrows are animals; all birds are animals; According to logic rules, the relation between sparrows and birds is indefinite. However, our empirical beliefs tell us 'all sparrows are birds'. Condition 2: all puppies are dogs; all black dogs are dogs; thus, the logical relation between puppies and black dogs is indefinite. It is obvious that this logic conclusion is empirically true. Therefore, our belief is inhibitory to the logical task in condition 1 (IBC, inhibitory belief condition), whereas the belief is facilitatory to the logical task in condition 2 (FBC, facilitatory belief condition). Evidently, this phenomenon is the famous 'belief-bias effect' in syllogistic reasoning that was repeatedly reported by previous studies [5, 9] .
Researchers raised several explanations to the belief-bias effect. Influential dual-process theories assume that system 1 (i.e. belief-based system) inclines people to reason with their beliefs that are operated rapidly and automatically, whereas system 2 (i.e. logic-based system) allows reasoning according to logical rules which heavily demands people's mental resources [9, 10] . Human reasoning is characterized by the interplay between system 1 and system 2 [9] .
Using functional MRI methodology, Goel et al. [5] found that system 2 was mediated by the right prefrontal cortex, whereas the ventral medial prefrontal cortex is associated with belief-bias responses in system 1. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how the two systems interact at each stage of the information-processing stream during reasoning. Event-related potentials (ERPs) technique is advantageous in exploring the temporal features of logical reasoning.
Using ERP technique, Qiu and colleagues [11] found that conditional reasoning tasks elicited a more negative ERP deflection than baseline task in the 500-700 and the 1700-2000 ms time windows, possibly related to the application of the inference rules and cognitive control, respectively. Despite extensive reports of the belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, and the neural mechanism underlying this effect [5, 9] , the temporal features of this effect is unknown, and what are the characteristics of this effect at different time points is still unclear. On the basis of this consideration, this study investigated spatiotemporal patterns of the brain in the performance of one syllogistic reasoning task with two conditions and one baseline condition (BSC) using high-density (64 channels) ERP recording system. We aimed to clarify the temporal features of the belief-bias effect and determine ERP components that embody this bias.
Materials and methods

Participants
As paid volunteers, 12 undergraduate students (six women, six men) aged 20-25 years (mean age, 22.4 years) participated in the study. All participants who gave written informed consent, right-handed, had no history of current or past neurological or psychiatric illness.
Materials
Familiar category (e.g. tiger, flower, animal) were selected as material. The specific format of syllogistic reasoning is as follows: all A are B; all C are B; therefore, the relation between A and C is indefinite. Two conditions (IBC and FBC) were examined when this format of syllogistic reasoning was filled by empirically true premises. According to the results of earlier studies [11, 12] , participants began to make inference when the minor premise appeared. Thus, we hypothesized that the minor premises might induce different ERPs across belief conditions. In addition, a BSC was devised in the experiment. For example: all A are B (major premise); all C are D (minor premise); so, all A are B/ all C are D (conclusion). For the BSC, the minor premise is irrelevant to the major premise. Therefore, participants cannot draw any conclusions with the onset of minor premises during the BSC. In addition, we selected other formats of syllogistic reasoning with concrete content as additional materials, for example, (i) all A are B; all B are C; so, all A are C. (ii) all B are C; all A are B; so, all A are C. (iii) All A are B; all A are C; so, some B are C. These additional materials were used to ensure the effective inference during minor premise onset, in case participants judged the validity of the conclusions without inference.
Procedure
The entire experiment was divided into a practice phase and a test phase. The practice consisted of 16 trials (four IBC trials, four FBC trials, four BSC trials, and four additional reasoning trials) to familiarize participants with the experimental procedure. The formal test stage was composed of five blocks, with each block including 64 trials (16 IBC trials, 16 FBC trials, 16 BSC trials, and 16 additional reasoning trials). The onset sequence of trials was randomized across the four categories (IBC, FBC, BSC, and additional trials). Participants were seated in a semidark room facing a monitor placed at 60 cm distance from the eyes, with the horizontal and vertical visual angles below 51. A given reasoning item was presented in the following way (see Fig. 1 ). Each trial was initiated by a '*' in the center of screen for 300 ms. Then, the major premise (six to eight Chinese characters, visual angle: 1.931 Â 0.811) was presented for 2500 ms. Immediately after a blank screen whose duration varied randomly between 200 and 400 ms, the minor premise (six to eight Chinese characters) was presented for 3500 ms during which participants needed to draw a logical conclusion based on the two premises. Subsequently, the blank screen that lasted for 200-400 ms was followed by the presentation of a conclusion (a sentence including 8-13 Chinese characters) for 2500 ms. Participants were asked to judge whether the conclusion was valid by pressing different keys as fast and accurately as possible on a keypad (the ratio of correct to incorrect conclusion was 1 : 1, see Table 1 ). In addition, they were instructed to keep their eyes fixated on the center of the monitor during the experiment to avoid ocular artifacts.
Event-related potential recording and analysis
Brain electrical activity was recorded at 64 scalp sites using tin electrodes mounted in an elastic cap (Brain Product, Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany), with the reference on the left and right mastoids. The vertical electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded with electrodes placed above and below the left eye. All interelectrode impedance was maintained below 5 kO. The electroencephalogram and EOG were amplified using a 0.05-100 Hz bandpass and continuously sampled at 500 Hz/channel for off-line analysis. Eye movement artifacts (blinks and eye movements) were rejected offline. Trials with EOG artifacts (mean EOG voltage exceeding 780 mV) and those contaminated with artifacts due to amplifier clipping, bursts of electromyographic activity, or peak-to-peak deflection exceeding 780 mV were excluded from averaging.
The ERP waveforms were time locked to the onset of the minor premises. The averaged epoch for the minor premises was 3700 msm, including a 200 ms prestimuli baseline. Only segments with correct judgment were taken into ERP analysis. On the basis of the grand averaged ERPs and topographical map (see Figs 2-4) , the following 18 electrode points were chosen for statistical analysis: AF3, AF4, FPz, F3, F4, Fz, FC3, FC4, FCz, C3, C4, Cz, CP3, CP4, CPz, P3, P4, and Pz. Mean amplitudes in each interval were analyzed using two-way repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs). The ANOVA factors were condition type (two levels: IBC, FBC, and BSC), and electrode site. analyses, the degrees of freedom of the F-ratio were corrected according to the Greenhouse-Geisser method.
Results
Behavioral data
The accuracy rates for the conclusion judgment during FBC, IBC, and BSC were 96.072. . Therefore, tasks in FBC seemed easier during the conclusion judgment, most likely because the belief is facilitatory to the task in this case.
Electrophysiological scalp data
As shown by Fig. 2 clear N1 and P2 were elicited by the three conditions, and there was no main or interaction effects observed at these components. In the 300-500 and 1000-1600 ms time windows, IBC and FBC both elicited a more positive ERP deflection (see Fig. 3 ) than did BSC. Moreover, IBC elicited a more positive ERP deflection (P500; see Fig. 4 ) than did FBC at 300-600 ms interval. Mean amplitudes in the time window of 300-400, 400-500, 500-600, 600-700, 700-800, 800-900, 900-1000, 1000-1200, 1200-1400, 1400-1600, 1600-1800, 1800-2000, 2000-2500, 2500-3000, and 3000-3500 ms were analyzed using a two-way repeatedmeasures ANOVAs (condition type and electrode site). The ANOVAs showed that there were main effects of task type in the time windows of 300-400 and 400-500 ms [F(2,22)¼12.822, Po0.01; F(2,22)¼13.089, Po0.001]. Mean amplitudes were more positive for IBC than for FBC and BSC at the 300-500 ms interval (Po0.01), and more positive for FBC than for BSC during the 300-500 ms interval (P¼0.06). In addition, mean amplitudes were more positive for IBC than for FBC [F(1,11)¼6.960, Po0.05] in the 500-600 ms interval. There were main effects of task type in the time windows of 1000-1200, 1200-1400, and 1400-1600 ms, F(2,22)¼5.034, Po0.05; F(2,22)¼5.867, Po0.05; F(2,22)¼4.044, Po0.05. Mean amplitudes were more positive for IBC and FBC than for BSC at the 1000-1600 ms interval (Po0.05; Po0.05).
Discussion
This study observed no significant differences in N1 and P2 amplitudes across IBC, FBC, and BSC, which suggests that the early visual and perceptual processes were similar during all three conditions, most likely because all minor All white skirts are clothes; All skirts are clothes; So, all white skirts are skirts.
Right logical conclusion presentation (40 items) e.g.
All puppies are dogs; All black dogs are dogs; So, the relation between puppies and black dogs is inde¢nite.
FBC (80 items)
Wrong logical conclusion presentation (40 items) e.g.
All Persian cat are cats; All small cats are cats; So, all Persian cats are small cats.
Right conclusion presentation e.g.
All £owers are plants; All pants are clothes; So, all £owers are plants (or: all pants are clothes).
BSC (80 items)
Wrong conclusion presentation e.g.
All trains are vehicles; All dogs are animals; So, all cars are vehicles.
Right logical conclusion presentation e.g.
All small tigers are tigers; All tigers are animals; So, all small tigers are animals.
Other formats Syllogistic reasoning (80 items)
Wrong logical conclusion presentation e.g.
All red apples are apples; All apples are fruits; So, the relation between red apples and fruits is inde¢nite.
Vol 19 No 10 2 July 2008
premises were Chinese sentences, equal in length and size across different conditions [13, 14] . IBC and FBC both elicited a more positive ERP deflection than did BSC in the 300-500 and 1000-1600 ms time windows, which probably reflects reasoning-related processes. In addition, IBC elicited a more positive ERP deflection (P500) than did FBC during relation integration stage of reasoning process.
As shown in Fig. 3 , in the 300-500 ms time window, IBC and FBC elicited an increased amplitudes in late positive component (LPC) component than did BSC postminor premise onset. Maps of the difference waves (IBC-BSC and FBC-BSC) showed strong activity in the right central scalp regions. In this study, minor premises were related to major premises in both inference conditions, whereas both premises were irrelevant to each other in BSC. Thus, participants had to recruit more attentional resources for activation and application of inference rules before the access to a logical conclusion in the two inference conditions [11] . This most likely contributed to the increased LPC amplitudes at this interval [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . Subsequently, IBC and FBC elicited a more positive deflection than did BSC in the 1000-1600 ms interval over the right frontal regions. This was most likely related to the cognitive control during the validation and maintenance of a logic conclusion, as suggested by earlier studies [11, 12, 18] .
More importantly, an enhanced positivity (P500) was observed in IBC than in FBC in the 300-600 ms interval. The topographical maps of the difference waves (IBC-FBC) showed the largest scalp activation in the central-frontal cortical regions (see Fig. 4 ). As described above, minor premises were sentences equal in size and length during the three conditions, and similar syllogistic reasoning processes were recruited during IBC and FBC conditions. Therefore, there should not have been an ERP difference between IBC and FBC conditions in this study if there were no differences in belief influences. In an influential dual-process model that accounts for belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, researchers raised that system 1 (i.e. belief-based system) inclines people to reason with their beliefs that are operated rapidly and automatically, whereas system 2 (i.e. logicbased system) allows reasoning according to logical rules which heavily demands people's mental resources [9, 10] . In a recent study, the ventral medial prefrontal cortex was suggested to be associated with system 1, whereas system 2 was mediated by the right prefrontal cortex [5] . Perhaps, the medial frontal activations evoked by the IBC-FBC difference wave reflected an inhibition to system 1, with which beliefs that obstruct the logical inference were inhibited. As a result, individuals reached a logical conclusion based on system 2. In this study, participants needed to integrate the relation between the two premises in both inference conditions. On the basis of the belief-bias system, the relation between sparrows and birds should be definite under the premises 'all sparrows are animals; all birds are animals' that were typical of IBC. This is inconsistent with the logical conclusion as inferred based on system 2. In contrast, with system 1 the relation between puppies and black dogs derived from premises of FBC (all puppies are dogs; all black dogs are dogs) was indefinite, which is consistent with the logical conclusion drawn by system 2. That is, the beliefbased system is inconsistent with the logic-based system in IBC, whereas the two systems in FBC are consistent. Therefore, it was necessary for participants to inhibit the belief bias that hampers the access to a logical conclusion in IBC, whereas this inhibition was absent during FBC. Moreover, based on the peak latency and the topographical distribution, the P500 we observed was in actual fact a component within LPC family that was repeatedly reported to be modulated by inhibitive process [13, 14, [19] [20] [21] . Therefore, the P500 (or LPC) in this study might reflect the mental inhibition to beliefs that are inconsistent with the logical conclusion during later relation integration, and participants in IBC needed to make much more mental effort to inhibit the beliefs which are opposite to the logical tasks.
Conclusion
Similar to earlier studies, this study observed an inferencerelated ERP activity in the 300-500 and 1000-1600 ms intervals, suggesting the application of inference rules and cognitive control, respectively. More importantly, IBC elicited a more positive ERP deflection (P500) than did FBC over central-frontal cortical regions in the 300-600 ms interval, which may index the inhibitive process on the beliefs that disagreed with the logical conclusion during relation integration stage. 
